

# V240m Series

PCI PTS POI v5.1 Security Policy

**Version 2.7 – 26 November 2020** 

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### **PURPOSE**

- This Security Policy provides guidance for the proper and secure usage of the PCI PTS
  POI Version 5.1 approved V240m payment terminal series including information on keymanagement responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, device functionality,
  identification, and environmental requirements
- Any deviation from the approved use of the device will invalidate the PCI PTS POI approval.

### **GENERAL DESCRIPTION**

#### PRODUCT NAME AND APPEARANCE

 Figure 1 shows the V240m terminal appearance. The standard color for the terminal is black, but it can be offered in distinct colors. Different keypad legends are provided according to the local requirements.



Figure 1, V240m Terminal



Figure 2, V240m Plus 3GBWC Terminal with Camera / Fingerprint module

• The product name is visible on the label at the back side of the device. See Figure 3.

#### PRODUCT TYPE

- The V240m is an integrated handheld Point-of-Interaction (POI) terminal designed to process online and offline transactions in an attended environment. The terminal is PCI PTS version 5 approved as a PED class of device.
- It is equipped to handle a variety of payment methods including: EMV chip and PIN, chip and signature, magnetic-stripe and contactless.
- It provides 2G or 3G cellular modem, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, USB host and device, two Secure Access Modules (SAMs) slots, and a Micro SD card slot.
- The terminal supports transmit-only Bluetooth beacons (iBeacon and Eddystone) and Over the Air (OTA) provisioning is not allowed.

#### **IDENTIFICATION**

The product model name (Model) and hardware version (HW ID) are printed on the label at the back side of the device; see Figure 3.

- The label should not be torn off, covered or manipulated in any way.
- Hardware version number includes variable fields for designating product options; see
   Table 1.

H 4 7 4 - 0 7 - X X - X X - X X - X X - B a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  Communication options:  • '04': 2G • '08': 3G • '08': 3G • '30': Bluetooth; Wi-Fi • '38': 3G; Bluetooth; Wi-Fi  12 Privacy-shield option  13 Keypad artwork  14 Device color  16 Memory configuration  Extra features  • Bit 0: Media • Bit 1: NCCA • Bit 2: Camera (model with camera)	Hardy	ware	vers	ion v	/aria	ble p	ositi	ons													
Communication options:   o '04': 2G o '08': 3G o '30': Bluetooth; Wi-Fi o '38': 3G; Bluetooth; Wi-Fi  Privacy-shield option  Keypad artwork  Device color  Memory configuration  Extra features  o Bit 0: Media o Bit 1: NCCA		Н	4	7	4	-	0	7	-	Х	Х	-	Χ	Χ	Χ	-	Χ	Χ	-	В	а
9, 10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
13 Keypad artwork  14 Device color  16 Memory configuration  Extra features  • Bit 0: Media  17 • Bit 1: NCCA		<ul> <li>'04': 2G</li> <li>'08': 3G</li> <li>'30': Bluetooth; Wi-Fi</li> </ul>																			
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Bit 0: Media     Bit 1: NCCA	16	Memory configuration																			
Bit 3: RFU	17	<ul> <li>Bit 0: Media</li> <li>Bit 1: NCCA</li> <li>Bit 2: Camera (model with camera)</li> </ul>																			
20 Hardware revision	20																				

Table 1, Hardware version variable positions





Figure 3, Hardware Identification via Product ID label

• The firmware versions can be retrieved from the boot splash screen. Shortly after powering up, a splash screen displays the version number for the four security kernels; see Figure 4. You must be able to find these numbers on the list of Approved PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Devices. If these numbers do not match, notify your service provider immediately.




Figure 4, Boot Splash Screen



Figure 5, Boot Splash Screen

• The three last digits in VFSRED version number show the SRED enablement status which is encoded according to Table 2.

SRED Enablement								
	Х	Х	Х					
	1	2	3					
1	<ul> <li>VCL/ADE encryption:</li> <li>0 = VCL and ADE are disabled</li> <li>1 = ADE is enabled</li> <li>2 = VCL is enabled</li> <li>3 = ADE and VCL are enabled</li> </ul>							
2	<ul> <li>ATOS Encryption:</li> <li>0 = ATOS is disabled</li> <li>1 = ATOS is enabled</li> </ul>							
3	Voltage encryption:  • 0 = Voltage is disabled  • 1 = Voltage is enabled							

Table 2, SRED Enablement

- In addition, the detailed information about the security kernel versions can be shown on request from the "Basic information" panel in System Mode. To view the security kernel versions, login in System mode and select "Home > Information > Basic information" panel. Scroll through the screen and locate the four kernels; see Figure 6.
- Security kernels are:
  - Vault
  - SRED (equivalent to VFSRED in boot splash screen)
  - Open Protocol (equivalent to VFOP in boot splash screen)
  - Application Manager (equivalent to AppM in boot splash screen)




Figure 6, Basic information panel

### INSTALLATION AND USER GUIDANCE

#### **INITIAL INSPECTION**

- 1) Carefully inspect the shipping carton and its contents for possible tampering or damage.
- 2) Validate the authenticity of the sender by verifying the shipping tracking number and other information located on the product order paperwork.
- 3) Remove the V240m unit from the shipping carton.
- 4) Remove any protective plastic wrap and place the unit on a table or countertop
- 5) Remove the clear protective film from the display.
- 6) Inspect the terminal for possible tampering; see how to identify signs of tampering in section Periodic Inspection.

7) Save the shipping carton and packing material for future repacking or moving the device.

#### **INSTALLATION**

- Prior to usage and deployment, familiarize yourself with the [R7] V240m Installation Guide (DOC474-003-EN-A). This guide provides information on verifying terminal equipment, usage, safety, security, environmental requirements, and troubleshooting steps if needed.
- The V240m terminal must be used in an attended environment.
- The terminal contains no user serviceable parts. Do not, under any circumstances, attempt to disassemble the terminal.

#### **ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS**

- The following are the temperature and humidity specifications of the V240m:
  - Operating temperature: 0° to 50° C (32° to 122° F)
  - O Storage temperature: -20° to 70° C (-4° to 158° F)
  - o Relative humidity: 5% to 90% (RH non-condensing)
- Subjecting the V240m to extreme environmental conditions will result in tamper events.
   Any temperatures above 100 °C (± 5 degrees) or below -37 °C (± 5 degrees) will result in a tamper condition. Additionally, should the battery voltage drift outside of the range of 2.2 VDC to 3.3 VDC, the unit will tamper as well.

#### **COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY PROTOCOLS**

- The V240m terminal supports the communications methods and protocols listed below.
   Use of any method not listed here invalidates the device PCI PTS approval.
- The following interfaces are available in the device:
  - o 2G or 3G cellular modem
  - USB Host

- USB Device
- Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy v4.2
- o Wi-Fi
- The following protocols and services are supported by the device:
  - o TLS/SSL
  - o SFTP, SSH
  - o DHCP, DNS, OCSP
  - o ICMP, TCP, IP, UDP
  - o PPP
- The security guidance described in this Security Policy and in [R9] V/OS IP Stack Security Guidance Users Guide specifies how protocols and services must be used/configured for each interface that is available on the device.

#### **CONFIGURATION SETTINGS**

 The device is functional when received by the merchant or acquirer. No security sensitive configuration settings are necessary to be modified by the end user to meet security requirements.

### **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**

#### PERIODIC INSPECTION

- Inspect the terminal for possible tampering after receipt, during installation and periodically. Signs of tampering include:
  - Wires protruding out of the device
  - o Foreign objects inserted into the smart card slot or mag stripe slot
  - Signs of damage to the tamper evident labels
  - o Tamper message on the device display; see Figure 7.

- Implement a procedure that checks the terminal serial number every time the device is started or powered on to ensure the device has not been replaced. If the device has been replaced, cease using the terminal and notify your Verifone customer relations manager.
- Visually inspect the terminal daily to ensure there are no foreign objects present in the smartcard slot; ensure there are no wires emanating from the smartcard slot.
- Develop a breach response plan. This identifies the steps to take if a suspected breach
  occurs and as well as who will perform each step. The plan needs to include isolation of
  your payment systems and a list of all personnel who need to be notified. These
  personnel include your local law enforcement, your acquiring bank, your processor,
  security assessor, as well as your payment system vendor.
- Track each instance of replaced terminals within the store. Whether from the in-store inventory, by a repair technician or with terminals shipped into the store.
- If any device is found in tamper state, please remove it from service immediately, keep it
  available for potential forensics investigation, and notify your company security officer
  and your local Verifone representative or service provider. For contacting Verifone,
  please see section "Verifone Service and Support" in [R7] V240m Installation Guide
  (DOC474-003-EN-A).

#### **SELF-TEST**

- V240m terminals employ a self-test to confirm firmware integrity and reinitialize memory.
   The self-test is performed:
  - When the unit powers
  - When the unit is rebooted
  - At least once every 24 hours
  - Upon demand
- Authorized maintenance personnel (system mode passwords required) may configure the V240m to perform self-test at a specified time or manually invoke the self-test option.
- The following components are checked during self-test:

- Integrity of the TMK (Terminal Master Key)
- Integrity of the other key files
- Tamper detection system
- VeriShield certificate tree
- o Firmware
- If a self-test fails, the V240m limits its functionality based on the severity of the issue discovered. Device response ranges from partial disablement of applications to nonfunctionality. In all cases PIN-processing is disabled.

#### **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

 Authorized terminal administrators can perform local downloading operations using the System Mode. Also, they can perform local key injection operations under dual control.

#### **PASSWORDS AND CERTIFICATES**

 Passwords used for entering in System Mode and entering sensitive services (key loading) are pre-expired and must be changed upon first use. These passwords must be at least 7 decimal characters (0-9) in length.

#### **TAMPER RESPONSE**

 Security mechanisms employed within the terminal can detect physical tampering and triggers a tamper event. This causes the terminal to cease performing transactions and indicates that it has been tampered on the display; see Figure 7.




Figure 7, Tamper message on the terminal display

#### **PRIVACY SHIELD**

- The V240m is a handover device. Always exercise extreme caution when conducting transactions, especially during PIN entry:
  - o Hand the terminal directly to the cardholder for PIN entry.
  - Encourage the cardholder to hold the terminal close and to orient himself as to prevent others from seeing the information being entered.

#### PATCHING AND UPDATING

 Updates and/or patches to the operating system can be installed in the device and may be performed locally or remotely. Updates/patches are RSA certificate authenticated. If

the signature of the updates cannot be authenticated, the update/patch is rejected and not installed.

- Local update functions are accessible within System Mode, and are supported via the following interfaces:
  - USB Memory Drive
  - SD Card
  - Serial Port
  - Netloader (A Verifone-based download protocol via an IP interface)
- o Remote update functions are supported via:
  - VHQ (Verifone's terminal management system)
  - Applications can use the software installation and secure communication
     APIs supported in the operating system.
- For the secure operation of the device, it is recommended to use the latest versions of the released software.

#### **DECOMMISSIONING**

- Before removing the device from service permanently or for repairs, all sensitive data must be erased. Sensitive data includes credit card data and all encryption keys inclusive of ALL Private, PIN, and Data encryption keys.
- If the device is permanently decommissioned from service, it can be done by disassembling the device in order to force a tamper condition, so all sensitive data will be erased automatically. After performing this operation, turn on the terminal and verify that the unit is in tamper state; see Figure 7.

#### REMOVAL DETECTION

Not applicable.

### **SECURITY**

#### SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE

- Applications must be designed and implemented in accordance with the PA-DSS requirements document entitled, [R13] PA-DSS Program Guide v3.2.
- When developing IP capable payment-based applications, developers must follow the guidance listed in the following documents:
  - This Security Policy
  - o [R8] V/OS Programmer's Manual
  - o [R9] V/OS IP Stack Security Guidance Users Guide
  - o [R12] VeriShield File Signing Overview
- All referenced best practices regarding coding practices and device configurations must be followed.
- Transaction data must be cleared as soon as the transaction is completed, including but not limited to working registers and buffers.

#### SSL

- TLS 1.2 (or higher) should be used. SSL is supported but this protocol is inherently weak and should be removed unless required on an interim basis to facilitate interoperability as part of a migration plan.
- Cipher suites using single DES or RC4 are not supported.
- For TLS 1.2 cipher suites (and higher), using TDES is no longer allowed by PCI PTS and are disabled by default.
- It is strongly advised to use TLS/SSL with mutual authentication enabled to protect the communications over a network connection.

#### **BLUETOOTH**

- The IP Stack supports Bluetooth BR/EDR (Classic), Bluetooth Low Energy v4.2 and transmit only beacons (iBeacon and EddyStone).
- Bluetooth interface is configured by the Operating System to enforce encryption and use PCI-PTS compliant secure pairing options only. No security sensitive configuration settings are necessary to be modified by the end user to meet the security requirements.
- Bluetooth Low Energy interface is configured to enforce encryption. This encryption is in addition to any other encryption the data may have undergone. This implies that the configuration of the GATT server must enable authenticated signed reads and writes of Characteristics, so that the communication will be only possible with paired clients.
- Beacons are transmitting only, and it cannot be used to transmit sensitive data. Over the air provisioning is not supported.
- Follow the instructions below to mitigate attacks on the Bluetooth interface:
  - Make sure that the terminal has the latest software updates and security patches.
  - Make sure that the peer device connected via Bluetooth, e.g. computer or mobile device, periodically receives software updates and security patches.
  - Perform Bluetooth pairing as infrequently as possible and, ideally, in a physically secure area where attackers cannot observe passkey entry and eavesdrop on Bluetooth pairing-related communications.
  - Provide application layer security on top of the Bluetooth to encrypt the data as a generic countermeasure to mitigate attacks to the Bluetooth interface.
  - Detailed information regarding the security capabilities of Bluetooth and recommendations to organizations employing Bluetooth wireless technologies on securing them effectively can be found in [R14] NIST Special Publication 800-121 – Guide to Bluetooth Security.

#### **SIGNING**

- VeriShield FST (File Signing Tool) manages the generation and signing of device certificates. See DevNet and [R12] VeriShield File Signing Overview for more information on signing tool implementation.
- V240m terminals employ a security architecture called VeriShield Retain, which has both physical and logical components. The logical security component, called File Authentication (FA) is part of the terminal's operating system software.
- File Authentication is a secured process for authenticating files using digital signatures, cryptographic keys, and digital certificates. This process enables the sponsor of a V240m terminal to logically secure access to the terminal by controlling who is authorized to download applications or firmware updates files to the terminal. It proves and verifies the file's origin, sender's identity, and the integrity of the file's information. If any of these three items are not verified, then the download is rejected.
- Only application codes that have been authorized for release should be signed and released to the field. The signing must occur under dual control and split knowledge.

#### **ACCOUNT DATA PROTECTION**

- If the product is SRED enabled:
  - The working buffers associated with PAN encryption clears automatically as soon as the transaction completes.
  - The encryption of PAN data is automatic and transparent to your application there are no added API calls needed.
- The device supports account data protection using format-preserving encryption (FPE) revised FF2.1 method. The pass-through of clear-text account data is supported using whitelisting technique (BIN table).
- In addition, the device supports account data encryption operations using TDEA DUKPT algorithm (ADE and ATOS Poseidon ZVT Security), AES DUKPT (VCL) and VISA DSP.

#### **ALGORITHMS SUPPORTED**

- The device supports the following algorithms:
  - o Triple DES (112 bits, 168 bits)
  - o AES (128 bits)
  - o RSA (2048 bits)
  - o ECDSA (256, 384, 521 bits)
  - o SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512

#### **KEY MANAGEMENT**

- The device supports the following key management schemes:
  - Fixed key (TDES)
  - Master Key / Session Key (TDES)
  - DUKPT (TDES and AES)
- Employing key management schemes that do not comply with PCI PTS with PCI payments will invalidate the PCI PTS approval for this device.
- For devices to be deployed in countries requiring Common.SECC certification, the use of fixed key or master/session key management schemes and PIN block format 0 for PIN encryption must be avoided and unique keys per transaction or the use of PIN block format 1 (random included) shall be used instead.
- The following table lists all supported key management schemes. For more information, refer to [R11] 2.0 Encryption Services Organization Key Management Procedures".

Key Name	Size (bytes)	Algorithm	Purpose
KLK (Key Loading Key)	16, 24	TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	To load encrypted master keys
Master Keys	16, 24	TDEA (FIPS 46-3, ANSI X3.92, X3.106); TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	Encryption of working keys (PEK, MEK, DK) for down-line transmission to the device
PIN Encryption Key (PEK)	16, 24	TDEA (FIPS 46-3, ANSI X3.92, X3.106); TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	PIN Encryption per master/session key scheme
MAC Encryption Key (MEK)	16	TDEA MAC (ANSI X9.19)	Message authentication per master/session key scheme
Data Keys (DK)	16	TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	Account balance decryption per master/session key scheme
PIN Fixed Keys	16, 24	TDEA (FIPS 46-3, ANSI X3.92, X3.106); TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	PIN Encryption per fixed key scheme
MAC Fixed Keys	16	TDEA (FIPS 46-3, ANSI X3.92, X3.106); TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	Message authentication per fixed key scheme
DUKPT TDEA Keys (PIN, MAC)	16	TDEA DUKPT (ANSI X9.24)	PIN encryption and message authentication per TDEA DUKPT scheme

DUKPT AES Keys (PIN, HMAC and data encryption)	16	AES DUKPT (ANSI X9.24 - 3)	PIN encryption, message authentication and account data encryption per AES DUKPT scheme
DUKPT TDEA ADE Keys	16	TDEA DUKPT (ANSI X9.24)	Account data encryption and MAC calculation per TDEA DUKPT scheme
ATOS Poseidon Keys	16	TDEA (ANSI X9.52)	PIN Encryption, message authentication, bitmap encryption and end-to-end encryption per ATOS Poseidon scheme
VCL Keys	16	AES-128	Keys for Format Preserving Encryption of card data per Verifone VCL scheme
Application Signer		RSA 2048 SHA-256	Used by customer to sign Applications to install to device.

Table 3, Key Table

#### **KEY LOADING**

- The terminal does not support manual cryptographic key entry. Key injection and management equipment must be managed in a secure manner to minimize the opportunity for compromise in accordance with items [R1], [R2], and [R4] in References.
- Physical keys, authorization codes, passwords, and other credentials must be managed under dual control and split knowledge so that no one person can use two credentials simultaneously.
- Key management security objectives must be in compliance with PCI PIN Transaction Security requirements.

#### **KEY REPLACEMENT**

 Key replacement must be performed upon any known or suspected compromise of any cryptographic or sensitive information, and whenever the time deemed feasible to determine the key by exhaustive attack elapses, as defined in NIST SP 800-57-1.

### **ANNEX**

#### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

- [R1] ANS x9.24 Part 1:2017, Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques
- [R2] ANS x9.24 Part 2:2017, Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 2: Using Asymmetric Techniques for the Distribution of Symmetric Keys
- [R3] ISO 9564-1, Financial Services Personal Identification Number (PIN) Management and Security Part 1: Basic Principles and Requirements for PIN's in Card-Based Systems
- [R4] X9 TR-31:2010, Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms
- [R5] ISO 9564-2, Banking, Personal Identification Number Management and Security Part 2: Approved Algorithms for PIN Encipherment
- [R6] SP800-57 Part 1: Recommendation for Key Management
- [R7] V240m Installation Guide (DOC474-003-EN-A)
- [R8] V/OS Programmer's Manual (VPN DOC00501)
- [R9] V/OS IP Stack Security Guidance Users Guide
- [R10] PCI PTS POI Modular Security Requirements v5
- [R11] 2.0 Encryption Services Organization Key Management Procedures
- [R12] VeriShield File Signing Overview
- [R13] PA-DSS Program Guide v3.2

#### **ACRONYMS**

#: Number

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

ANSI: American National Standards Institute

API: Application Programming Interface

DES: Data Encryption Standard

DUKPT: Derived Unique Key Per Transaction

FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standards

FA: File Authentication

FST: File Signing Tool

LCD: Liquid Crystal Display

MAC: Message Authentication Code

PA-DSS: Payment Application Data Security Standard

PAN: Personal Account Number

PCI: Payment Card Industry

PED: PIN Entry Device

PIN: Personal Identification Number

POI: Point of Interaction

PTS: PIN Transaction Security

RH: Relative Humidity

RSA: Rivest Shamir Adleman

SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm

SRED: Secure Reading and Exchange of Data

TDEA: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm

TMK: Terminal Master Key

VPN: Verifone Publication Number