



PAX S915

Security Policy

[V1.00]

PAX Computer Technology (Shenzhen) Co.,Ltd.

Contents

1	Purpose	1
2	General Description.....	1
2.1	Product Name and Appearance	1
2.2	Product Type	2
2.3	Product Identification	2
2.3.1	Hardware Version	2
2.3.2	Software Version.....	3
3	Installation and User Guidance	4
3.1	Initial Inspection.....	4
3.2	Installation	4
3.3	Environmental Conditions.....	4
3.4	Configuration Settings.....	5
3.5	Periodic Inspection and Maintenance	5
3.6	Roles and Responsibilities	6
3.7	Passwords and Certificates.....	6
3.8	Decommissioning.....	6
4	Hardware Security.....	7
4.1	Tamper Response	7
4.2	Privacy Shield	7
5	Software Security	8
5.1	Self-test.....	8
5.2	Patching and Updating	8
5.3	Software Signing/Authentication	8
5.4	Software Development Guidance.....	9
5.5	Account Data Protection	9
6	Key Management	10
6.1	Algorithms Supported	10
6.2	Key Management	10

6.3	Key Table	10
6.4	Key Loading	11
6.5	Key Replacement	12
7	Communication	12
	Appendix	13
	Acronyms	13
	References	13

1 Purpose

This document is to provide guidance for users to use the device in a secure manner, including information on key-management responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, device functionality, identification and environmental requirements.

The use of any method not listed in this security policy will invalidate the PCI PTS POI v6.0 approval of the device.

2 General Description

2.1 Product Name and Appearance

Figure 1 shows the appearance of PAX S915.

The product name is visible both on the front view of the device and on the label at the back side. The product name shall not be covered by a sticker or modified by merchant.



Figure 1 PAX S915 Appearance




Figure 2 PAX S915 Model Name

2.2 Product Type

The device is approved as a handheld PED product under PCI PTS POI v6.0 requirement, and designed to process online and offline financial transactions in an attended environment.

It provides color display, keypad (PIN entry), IC card reader (ICCR), MSR, Contactless card reader, barcode scanner, printer, cellular, WIFI, USB communications and power interface.

The use of the device in an unapproved method will violate the PCI PTS approval of the device.

2.3 Product Identification

2.3.1 Hardware Version

Hardware Version:

S915-xxx-0x6-Axxx (without CTLS)

S915-xxx-Rx6-Axxx (with CTLS)

The “x” is non-security related variables.

The product hardware version is visible on the label at the back side of the device (See figure 3). The label shall not be taken off, altered or covered in any way.



Figure 3 Hardware Identification

2.3.2 Software Version

Firmware Version: 6.00.xx

The right two “x” represents non-security related changes, such as system UI changed, functional bug fixed, drivers updated, etc.




Figure 4: Firmware Version Example

The version information can be retrieved as below operations.

1. Press “Power” button to power on the device and at the first time the screen lights please press “MENU” button continuously until a “Beep” tone gives out.
2. After the automatic self-test, the screen will show Menu information.
3. Select “4-Show Version”, the version information displays on the screen, including:
 - Serial number (shown as “SN” and same as the label at the backside of device)
 - Hardware version (same as the label at the backside of device)
 - Firmware version (shown as “SecurityVer”, “Firmware #”)

3 Installation and User Guidance

3.1 Initial Inspection

In order to make sure the product received is exactly the same as what is specified, the acquirer or merchant must check the product according to below tips.

- Only obtain devices from PAX or PAX approved resellers.
- Check the integrity and correctness of devices.
 - Check the label of PAX logo outside the master carton is complete and non-defective.
 - Check the labels of serial number listed on the master carton are non-defective.
 - Check the serial number on each device the same as the one shown on the packing box and master carton.
 - Check the contents in each packing box are the same as the packing list.
 - Package style: one machine into a printed box, then boxes into a master carton.
 - Check whether there is tampered message on the display after power up.

Please refer to [3] PAX White Paper for more details. If additional technical information is needed, please contact our local support team.

3.2 Installation

The terminal must be used in an attended environment.

The terminal should be kept away from the direct sunlight, high temperature, humidity or dusty places.

The wireless terminal should be kept away from the complex environment of electromagnetic radiation.

The terminal should be checked according to section 3.5 when installation.

3.3 Environmental Conditions

The environmental conditions to operate the device are specified in the below condition.

- Working Environment:

Temperature: -10°C ~ +50°C (14°F ~ 122°F)

R.H.: 5%~93% (Non-condensing)

- Storage Environment:

Temperature: $-20^{\circ}\text{C}\sim 70^{\circ}\text{C}$ ($-4^{\circ}\text{F}\sim 158^{\circ}\text{F}$)

R.H.: 5%~96% (Non-condensing)

- Power supply: DC 5.0V / 2.0A
- Environmental protection features:

Temperature sensor: $-35\pm 5^{\circ}\text{C}\sim 100\pm 10^{\circ}\text{C}$ ($-31\pm 41^{\circ}\text{F}\sim 212\pm 50^{\circ}\text{F}$)

Voltage sensor: $1.9\pm 0.1\text{V}\sim 3.6\pm 0.1\text{V}$

The security of the device is not compromised by altering the environmental conditions (e.g. place the device outside the stated operating ranges' temperature or operating voltages does not alter the security).

3.4 Configuration Settings

The security functions are an inherent part of firmware functions. No security sensitive configuration settings are necessary to be tuned by the end user in order to meet security requirements.

3.5 Periodic Inspection and Maintenance

Periodic inspection is required every day. Users should check the following items.

- Missing or damaged screws.
- Incorrect or redundant keyboard overlays.
- Holes in the device housing that should not exist.
- External wires around the device.
- Missing or unmatched manufacturer barcode label.
- Any suspicious objects inside or around IC card slot, refer to section 2.1.
- Any suspicious objects internal and around MSR slot, refer to section 2.1.
- Tamper message on the device display, refer to “Tamper Prompt” in section 4.1.

If you find any anomalies, which indicate the device may have been opened even tampered, stop using the device immediately and contact your supplier to explain your doubt.

3.6 Roles and Responsibilities

The customers of PAX are acquirer or Value Added Resellers (VAR). We also refer to VAR as acquirer directly. PAX sells devices and provides support for technical issues as well as maintenance to acquirer. The acquirer sells the devices to end users and provides services to their end users. PAX, acquirer and end users play different roles in operating the device. Below table shows different roles and operations:

Table 1 Different roles and responsibilities

	Role	Responsibilities
VAR/Acquirer/Merchant	administrator	1. Organize the third party to develop application program; 2. Download customer public key and application.
End User	operator	Perform transaction
PAX	maintainer	1. Sign customer public key 2. Repair device and unlock the device if tampered

3.7 Passwords and Certificates

There is no security related default value that is necessary to be changed before operating the device.

The device does not include any certificate for testing purpose after being manufactured.

3.8 Decommissioning

Sensitive data and keys must be erased before decommissioning the device and removing it from service permanently. This can be done by rendering the device into tampered status, such as disassemble the device. If just temporary removal (for example, maintenance personnel unbind the server, etc.), it's not necessary to remove the keys.

4 Hardware Security

4.1 Tamper Response

In the tamper event, the device will turn into the locked status and only tamper message will be displayed on the screen without any other tamper warning. No further secure function can be performed on the device.




Figure 5 Tamper Prompt

If the device is in tampered state, the user must contact the device maintenance or authorized center immediately, remove it from service and keep it away from potential illegal investigation.

4.2 Privacy Shield

The device is designed to be used on hand therefore the device does not contain a privacy shield. The device is compliant to the character of handheld device as required by Appendix A.2.

It is recommended to enter password as following ways:

- Make sure the cardholder hold the device on hand during PIN entry.
- Make sure the cardholder keeps a distance from others on check stand.
- Through guidance message or logos to indicate user to use his body or free hand to block the view of keypad.
- Make sure no video camera towards the keypad.
- Remind the cardholder to examine if anyone spies the keypad before PIN entry.

5 Software Security

5.1 Self-test

The device employs a self-test to confirm the legality of firmware and software, as well as reinitialize memory.

The device performs self-test during initial start-up and the periodical self-test at least every 24 hours automatically.

The self-test includes:

- Check integrity and authenticity of firmware
- Check integrity and authenticity of application

If any of the above check fails, the device will be disabled in a secure manner. In this case, please contact the supplier center.

5.2 Patching and Updating

Update and/or patch to the firmware, software and configuration parameters can be installed into the device. And both local and remote update and/or patch downloading are supported.

Any security related update and/or patch loaded into PAX terminals must be signed using RSA certificate. If the signature of the update and/or patch cannot be authenticated, the update and/or patch will be rejected and not be installed.

For the secure operation of the device, it is recommended to use the latest versions of the released firmware and software.

5.3 Software Signing/Authentication

The User Key Management Machine (uKMM) provided by PAX is used to sign User Application. The uKMM administrators perform user private key loading operation and signing process under dual control and split knowledge.

Only the application codes that have been authorized for release should be signed.

Application update uses SHA-256 in combination with RSA 2048 bits for authentication and signature verification.

Application is verified by the firmware before it is loaded and executed. If the verification fails, application can't be loaded into device and executed. The signature and verification mechanism ensures the authenticity and integrity of the application that is loaded into device.

5.4 Software Development Guidance

PAX provides software programming guide to developers to develop applications compliant with PCI security requirement. Please refer to [5] Secure Application Development Guide when developing SRED applications and IP enabled applications.

The device does not allow unauthorized or unnecessary functions.

5.5 Account Data Protection

The device always provides SRED functionality and doesn't support the disablement (turning off) of SRED functionality.

For the SRED module, account data can be encrypted by TDES/AES encryption.

The firmware of device doesn't support whitelisting for the pass-through of clear-text account data. For more details, please refer to [5] Secure Application Development Guide.

6 Key Management

6.1 Algorithms Supported

The device supports the following algorithms:

- Triple DES (128 bits/192 bits)
- AES (128 bits/192 bits/256 bits)
- RSA (2048 bits)
- SHA-256
- ECC (256 bits/521 bits)

6.2 Key Management

The device supports the following key management methods:

- Master/Session Key

This method uses a hierarchy of Terminal Loading Key, Master Key and Session Key. The highest level of Terminal Loading Key is distributed through the key loading device. The Master Key is distributed under the protection of Terminal Loading Key. The Session Key is distributed under the protection of Master Key. These keys can be replaced by the same methods whenever compromise is known or suspected.

- DUKPT

This method uses a unique key for each transaction, and prevents the disclosure of any past keys used by the transaction-originating device.

The use of the POI with unapproved key management systems will result in non-compliance with PCI PTS POI security requirement.

6.3 Key Table

Table 2 RSA public key

Key name	Size (bits)	Algorithm	Usage
User public key (PAX_US_PUK/C_US_PUK)	2048	RSA	Public key for application authentication

Table 3 Symmetric Key

Key name	Size(bytes)	Algorithm	Purpose/Usage
Terminal Loading Key (TLK)	16/24 (TDES) 16/24/32 (AES)	TDES/AES	To load encrypted master keys
DUKPT Initial Key (TIK)	16 (TDES) 16/24/32 (AES)	TDES/AES	DUKPT Initial Key
Master Key (TMK)	16/24 (TDES) 16/24/32 (AES)	TDES/AES	To load encrypted session keys
PIN Key (TPK)	16/24 (TDES MK/SK) 16 (TDES DUKPT) 16/24/32 (AES MK/SK) 16/24/32 (AES DUKPT)	TDES/AES	PIN encryption for PINBLOCK format 0,1,3 under TDES algorithm; PIN encryption for PINBLOCK format 4 under AES algorithm.
MAC Key (TAK)	16/24 (TDES MK/SK) 16 (TDES DUKPT) 16/24/32 (AES MK/SK) 16/24/32 (AES DUKPT)	TDES/AES	MAC Calculation
Account Data Encryption Key (TCHDK)	24 (TDES MK/SK) 16 (TDES DUKPT) 16/24/32 (AES MK/SK) 16/24/32 (AES DUKPT)	TDES/AES	Account Data Encryption
Data Key (TDK)	16/24 (TDES MK/SK) 16 (TDES DUKPT) 16/24/32 (AES MK/SK) 16/24/32 (AES DUKPT)	TDES/AES	Arbitrary Data Encryption

6.4 Key Loading

The terminal does not support manual cryptographic key entry.

The terminal supports local key injection by using a key loader tool under dual control and split knowledge in a secure environment.

6.5 Key Replacement

Whenever the compromise of the key is known or suspected and whenever the time deemed feasible to determine the key by exhaustive attack elapses, the key must be removed or replaced with a new key.

7 Communication

The terminal supports cellular and WIFI secure communications for transactions, please refer to [5] Secure Application Development Guide for more information.

The terminal supports USB communication.

The terminal supports TLS v1.2 security protocol for TCP/IP security communication, including WIFI and cellular. Mutual authentication is provided by TLS v1.2.

Appendix

Acronyms

Abbreviation	Description
PIN	Personal Identification Number
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adelman Algorithm
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
DUKPT	Derived Unique Key per Transaction

References

- [1] ANS X9.24 - 1:2009, Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques
- [2] ANS X9.24 Part 2: 2006, Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 2: Using Asymmetric Techniques for the Distribution of Symmetric Keys
- [3] PAX White Paper.pdf
- [4] PAX PCLoader Operation Guide.pdf
- [5] Secure Application Development Guide.pdf